Hedging for Alternatives: Turkey’s Foreign Policy after the Iran War

Introduction

On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed the landmark Mecca Joint Defense Agreement under which “any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.” The long anticipated pact, in deepening defence cooperation between these countries, has been billed as creating a sort of “Islamic NATO”. This new alliance, it is hoped, will establish a changing security architecture in the region particularly after the Iran war revealed the vulnerabilities of states relying on American protection.

This article focuses on Turkey’s defence posture in the aftermath of the conflict between the US and Israel against Iran. Turkey is now a member of the western NATO and this new ‘eastern’ NATO, protected by both alliances, and flexible in its reliance on either. In hedging between them, Turkey has strengthened its hand while boosting the possibility of trade for its own defence industry. As Israeli eyes seem to be increasingly turning towards the land straddling the Bosphorus; coming under two umbrellas may be very beneficial for the Eurasian country. 

A Regional Shift

At NATO’s 2026 Summit in Turkey, President Erdoğan gifted his fellow heads of state an unusual party favour, an engraved revolver alongside ammunition. This gift was a message aimed at showcasing Turkey’s impressive defence industry that has become the most valuable export sector and foreign policy tool in itself. The geopolitical context behind this gesture is attached to the regional transformations occurring in the aftermath of the Iran War.

The New Iran

The first of these may be the fact that Israel increasingly sees Turkey as its new rival in the region. Discussions within Israeli political discourse portray Turkey as Israel’s most significant long-term regional competitor with Turkey being described as “the new Iran”. Similar arguments have appeared in The Jerusalem Post, where articles have discussed ‘the growing threat Erdoğan poses to Israel’.

Most influentially, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has likewise referred to Turkey as “the new Iran”, and in February he accused Turkey of “trying to flip Saudi Arabia against us and establish a hostile Sunni axis with nuclear Pakistan.” An Israeli intelligence analyst has called Hakan Fidan, the Turkish foreign minister who allegedly has close ties to Iran, as “the most dangerous man for Israel in the region”.

This rhetoric reflects an indication that Israel already believes Iran has been removed as a threat (which it has not) as well as a broader concern that Turkey is emerging as the only regional power possessing the demographic, economic and conventional military capabilities necessary to challenge Israeli influence across multiple theatres. It may be that the Israeli war machine also needs perpetual enemies to justify its bloated defence aid from the US as well as to prop up its military hegemony in the region.

Whether this narrative evolves into official Israeli strategy remains uncertain. However, perceptions themselves matter in international politics. Strategic rivalries often develop not only through military actions but through the gradual construction of threat perceptions within political and public discourse. As mutual suspicion deepens through the inevitable security dilemma, policymakers begin interpreting one another’s actions through increasingly adversarial lenses.

A Weaker NATO

A key issue for Turkey therefore is the fact that it may not be able to rely on NATO if Israel turns its crosshairs from Tehran to Ankara. The United States is appearing increasingly willing to abandon certain aspects of the liberal international order it helped create in favour of a more transactional approach. For regional powers like Turkey, this evolving environment will create a power vacuum full of opportunities. As traditional alliances become less stable, states will find themselves competing for influence in an international system that is less constrained by previously established norms.

US President Donald Trump has long aired his grouses against the organisation and its members for failing to pay their dues. He arrived at Ankara a few months ago for the annual summit threatening to withdraw American troops from Europe unless he got Greenland. He has also long complained about the cost of supplying arms to Ukraine in its war against Russia, a war arguably provoked by NATO enlargement (with American approval).

Since the Russia-Ukraine war started, Turkey has viewed NATO as a more transactional arrangement. This is indicated by the effort required to win Turkish approval for Sweden’s membership, which was finally gained in exchange for the sale of F-16s to the country. However, more recently, in July 2026, Israel openly opposed US President Trump’s consideration of selling F-35 stealth fighter jets to Turkey. As NATO’s biggest power, the US has enormous sway over the organisation’s policy. In turn, the Israel lobby’s influence over the US is also well documented. Given these worrying headwinds, it would be appropriate for Turkey to hedge its bets and be protected not only by American and British nuclear weapons, but also Pakistani ones. In aligning itself with Muslim countries as well as European nations, Turkey can buttress itself against Israeli coercion.

The Erdoğan Factor

Turkey’s strategic autonomy approach to foreign policy has been credited heavily to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He has dominated Turkish politics for over two decades, first as Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014, and now as President since 2014. His rhetoric comprises restoring a self-sufficient Turkey, reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire. In fact the inspiration from the Ottoman Empire can be seen as the justification for Erdoğan’s lengthy reign of power. This includes speaking for the Muslim world, connecting Turkey to Central Asia and leading the regional order. This is a major driver of Erdoğan’s foreign policy.

In 2024, Erdoğan’s party, AKP, lost the local elections and polling suggests far lower support for Erdoğan as president. One of the few decisions working in Erdoğan’s favour is his stance on the Gaza genocide. It is also precisely why Turkey’s response has been loud yet careful in action. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, Erdoğan has become one of Israel’s most outspoken critics among NATO leaders. Turkey has consistently recognised the State of Palestine, condemned Israel’s genocidal operations in Gaza, called for international legal institutions to take action, and refused to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation, instead describing it as a resistance movement.

However, in local elections in March 2024, Erdoğan’s party lost votes to further right parties who criticised him for not taking a firmer stand against Israel. Since then, Turkey has taken a more pro-Hamas slant, hosting the late Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Ankara in April of that year. Erdoğan also announced that more than 1,000 Hamas members had been treated at Turkish hospitals, a claim he later withdrew. Most of this is for the domestic audience, however, given a trade embargo was not imposed on Israel until 2024. Even with the embargo in place, most of the oil Israel imports is transported by pipeline through Turkey or shipped through a Turkish port.

While it is unclear currently who will succeed Erdoğan in 2028 (it could be the current Foreign Minister or the President’s son in law, a drone mogul), it is clear that Erdoğan has been strategic and calculating in his ability to strategically maneuver Turkey’s ideological, security and business sectors all at once. Much of Turkey’s ability to straddle the fault lines of geopolitics between East and West relies on his successor being able to do the same.

Turkey’s Future Foreign Policy

Turkey is deeply embedded within multiple geopolitical systems simultaneously. It remains economically integrated with Europe through extensive trade and investment, is a longstanding member of NATO, maintains pragmatic relationships with Gulf monarchies, preserves channels of communication with Russia despite competing interests in Syria, Libya and the Black Sea, and continues to play a pivotal role in Black Sea security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Rather than depending on a single alliance or ideological bloc, Turkey has deliberately cultivated multiple diplomatic, economic and security relationships that maximise its strategic flexibility. On the other hand, Turkish foreign policy strategy has relied extensively on ideological alignment. Furthermore, this multidimensional approach has become the defining characteristic of Turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. Turkey has invested heavily in its indigenous defence industry, expanded diplomatic and economic engagement across Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, intervened militarily in Syria and Libya to protect what it views as core national interests. Sinan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat turned scholar, argues that this strategy is best understood through the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. In Ülgen’s view, both Turkey and the European Union increasingly seek greater autonomy from overreliance on the United States, albeit for different reasons, creating opportunities for renewed cooperation rather than divergence.

The importance of this flexibility becomes even clearer when considering Turkey’s membership of NATO. The alliance’s greatest value for Turkey lies in its broader institutional framework. Intelligence sharing, integrated air defence, military interoperability, logistical cooperation and access to advanced technologies all contribute to Turkey’s strategic depth. It is this security umbrella that has enabled Turkey to pursue a more independent foreign policy over the past two decades. Strategic autonomy has therefore been made possible, rather than constrained, by continued participation in Western security institutions. NATO membership not only enhances Turkish military capabilities but also raises the political and strategic costs of coercion against Turkey by any external actor.

However, this creates a strategic paradox. If Turkey were to define its foreign policy primarily through confrontation with Israel while simultaneously distancing itself from NATO and Europe, it would undermine the very flexibility that constitutes its greatest geopolitical advantage. At the same time, any sustained deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations would create difficult challenges for the United States, which has NATO ally connections and responsibilities to Turkey yet is closely aligned with Israel. Additionally, it must be noted that as long as NATO stands and Turkey is a member, then Turkey is well within its rights to invoke Article 5 to its benefit. This provides a safety net for Turkey that comes at a strict disadvantage for Israel.

The vision that emerges is not one in which Turkey is engaging towards conflict with Israel, but rather of a country navigating a crowded field of international relationships as the regional balance is shifting. The Iran war has left a vacuum of power, and Israel, which is accustomed to defining itself against a principal adversary, has begun looking at Turkey to fill that role. This is due to Israel adapting to the loss of Iran as an ‘enemy’, not due to Turkey provoking confrontation.  Turkey must ensure it is not dragged into playing this part it has been assigned.

Turkey is aware of this. Its response to the genocide in Gaza has been loud yet operationally cautious, with the use of sanctions and diplomacy rather than arms and intervention. Its NATO membership, however conditional that may or may not prove to be in the future, raises the cost of any action taken against Turkey.

Moreover, the Mecca Agreement shows its growing influence over Asia, Africa and Central Asia. This creates a new venue for deepening diplomatic and economic ties between regional partners and allows for strategic portfolio diversification. As a mix of “Saudi money, Turkish technology, Pakistani military power”, it offers a win-win for Turkey. It joins a new regional arrangement which does not require it to leave NATO, allows it to claim Erdoğan’s dream of a revamped Ottoman empire in a newly formed Muslim collective defence mechanism, and offers new bazaars for Turkish defence industries.

Rather than allowing itself to become locked into a conflict with Israel, Turkey’s comparative advantage lies in preserving strategic autonomy. Its greatest strength has never been overwhelming military superiority, but its ability to operate simultaneously across multiple geopolitical spheres while retaining partnerships with actors that often compete with one another. In an increasingly fragmented regional order, maintaining that flexibility is likely to offer Turkey greater long-term influence than defining itself through permanent confrontation with any single state. The engraved revolver handed out after the NATO Summit was a statement of confidence. It is a signal to the world of Turkey’s growing might and defense industry, a warning shot to Israel, and a declaration to Europe that it is a regional heavyweight in two continents.

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